Friday, February 16, 2018

Video Nabs Poker Card-Swapping Pair at Grosvenor UK Casino

Jolly Card-Switching Buddies
Apparently the two laddies were drunk the night they played 3-card poker at the Grosvenor casino in Stockton. But that didn't stop 54-year-old Ian Banki and 51 year-old Steven Pooley from pulling a little card switch at the poker that netted the card-swapping cheats $2,500.

There was no one else involved in the scam. The dealer was distracted by a fellow employee coming over to the table and the pair just seized the moment.

In fact, Banki told the judge, "There's not a lot we can say. We didn't go in there to cheat. We had a good drink and it just happened. We are very very embarrassed and ashamed of what we did."

Well, that "good" drink turned sour when casino personnel played back the video and saw the pair switch the cards.

The judge, Kristina Harrison, after listening to Banki's excuse, said, "Probably opportunistic after a few drinks." She then ordered the pair to pay back the money they swindled from Grosvenors and slapped Banki with fines and costs totalling $150 and Pooley $450. I don't no why she held Pooley three times more responsible than Banki--Must be a personal quirk.

My take: Well, I think this judge was both cool and fair. She didn't make a big deal of this and give the pair a prison term or a felony conviction.

The Ol' False Shuffle Scam in a New Casino Bad-Beat Jackpot Scam

The Ol' false shuffle back again!
The Bad-Beat Poker Jackpot was set at more than $166,000, and sixty-six-year-old poker dealer Ashley Solomon and his fifty-one-year-old cheat-agent Dale Foret decided it was ripe enough for the taking. So Solomon set up the deck to give Foret a very high-value losing hand and some other player at the table who was not involved in the scam and even better one.

He then performed a false shuffle to protect the order of the cards set up.

The exact values of the hand were not disclosed. Usually, a bad-beat jackpot occurs when there is a losing hand of at least Aces-full. In some casinos the losing hand must be four of a kind or a straight flush.

Apparently, Solomon set up the cards right on the table in front of all the players, which leads me to believe that several had to be involved in the scam. It is quite difficult to set up an entire deck without any of the players noticing it.

As is routine each time a bad-beat jackpot is hit, casino surveillance reviews the video to see if there were any irregularities. They spotted the false shuffles and therefore expelled the jackpot and called the Louisiana State Police Enforcement Divsion, who arrested the couple.

BTW, even though each of the two poker cheats has a unisex name, they are both men. 

North Korean Computer Hacker/Defector Reveals Army of North Korean Hackers Attacking Online Poker Sites From Their Base in China!

North Korean Army of Online Poker Hackers
I first blogged about this back in May of last year when reports of North Korean hackers breaching online poker began surfacing.

Now a North Korean hacker/defector calling himself "Jong" has gone public with his detailed story of an actual army of Korean leader Kim Jong Un's very skilled hackers sitting in wide rows and long columns in barren warehouses infiltrating online poker and casinos.

According to Jong, each hacker was personally responsible to send their leader Kim Jong Un at least US $100,000 per year of hacking proceeds.

 All this while they lived in deplorable conditions in downtrodden areas of Chinese cities.

Jong said they were treated like unskilled laborers and that their living conditions were so bad that many suffered from hunger and disease. He added that the mere thought of going south on the North Korean dictator with any money was inconceivable, of course only out of fear.

The North Korean Hacking Army did several things to pilfer money from online sites.

First, they just stole money outright.

Second, they garnered player-information and sold it to online poker cheats and collusion operations.

Third, they stole commercial software and used sophisticated bots to assemble multi-player assaults on online games.

Jong said the whole thing was torture and he couldn't take it anymore, so he risked his life to defect. 

My take: Well, maybe Jong can be of service to Western governments and supply valuable computer-hacking info to the CIA and other agencies???.

Tuesday, February 06, 2018

Table Game Protection Post: Game Protection Training Dilema: Should Casino Floor Personnel Be Trained Together with Surveillance Personnel?

This is a very common question.

The worry that most casino upper managers have is that if Gaming Floor People are shown all the cheat moves that Surveillance Personnel are, the result might lead to more inside dealer/floorperson/surveillance scams against the casino, or simply that casino floor people should not have as much knowledge of scams as surveillance, so that they might not be tempted on their own to cheat their tables.

I have always conducted my game protection training with the two groups together. I feel strongly about this because I believe the casino staff on the floor must be on the same page as the surveillance staff "upstairs."

True, there are potential negatives, even dangers. But let's look at a few facts first.

The first is that collusion scams performed by casino floor staffs very rarely involve surveillance people. So by that alone, you can rid yourselves of the worry of a major scam going down in your casino from the bottom all the way up. That can only happen in a casino that has disastrously poor internal controls and game-protection policy, and complete lack of adherence if there is any game-protection policy in place.

Second: There are always some dealers who turn to cheating the house. This can NEVER be avoided. But the global percentage, even in casinos with poor internal controls that are literally asking their dealers to cheat them, is extremely low, probably lower that the vast majority of worldwide industries.

With that in mind, excluding dealers and floor supervisors from knowledge of the inner-workings of table scams being taught to surveillance staffs will have a negative impact on your casinos.


Simply because your dealers are your first line of defense against ALL casino scams not involving dealers. If they are ignorant to a particular cheating scam happening on their tables, then, unless a very sharp supervisor behind them takes notice of the moves going down, surveillance immediately becomes your FIRST line of defense.

Now I have absolutely no bias against surveillance staffs, but in my 25-year casino-cheating career, not once has a cheat-move of mine been spotted on time or stopped by surveillance alerting the gaming pits.

I mean NOT ONCE!

This is not to say that surveillance operators aren't efficient. By and large they do a great job, especially if they have good training and follow internal policy. But it is much too difficult to spot the majority of professional moves when you're away from the table--no matter how good your equipment is.

Remember, good game protection must come from the floor up. Surveillance serves best when the floor staff alerts them to something suspicious. Then they can focus in on whatever it is going down on the tables, and then mobilize the entire casino to eradicate the problem.

So all that said, it is firmly my opinion that you should train your floor staffs in game protection, cheating and advantage play as you do your surveillance staffs.

However, I do suggest that if dealers are participating in game protection training, they should not be present when inside-dealer scams are being presented. They can learn these when and if they become supervisors.

I would love to hear your opinions on this, and if they may have changed after reading this post!

Yet ANOTHER Insider-Dealer/Agents Baccarat Cheat Scam in Macau!

More tricky fingers at Macau bacc tables
It seems I'm copying and posting the same article every week!

Same old Macau Baccarat Cheat story: Crooked dealer teams up with wife/husband/friend or all of the aforementioned and helps them win on the baccarat tables.

And the amazing thing about it is the banality of the scams. You have to wonder what they're thinking in terms of how long they might get away with it.

This time, the dealer, like with all the other times, simply did not take her cohorts' losing bets when they lost, and sometimes even switched them to winning bets after they lost and made them winners, which she paid. (Yes it was a female dealer--Macau does not discriminate against cheating feminine dealers.)

I am not too familiar with the Macau dealers scene, but I imagine they earn a good living and should not have such a pressing reason to cheat and steal from their casinos. Maybe I'm wrong.

And maybe Macau's casinos are not properly vetting their dealers before hiring them.

Or maybe the dealers have picked up on internal game-protection weaknesses in their casinos and are simply exploiting them.

If you want the details of yet another redundant baccarat scam, you can read them in this article.

Golden Triangle Area Casino is Huge Den of Iniquity

Gateway to casino Iniquity
Those of us old enough to remember the days of the Vietnam War, the Golden Triangle was the name given to a corner of Southeast Asia where opium was cultivated to manufacture heroin. The three countries that formed the triangle were Laos, Burma and Thailand. This territory had a major impact on US forces who served in Vietnam, and it was not good one. It helped turn many US soldiers into heroin addicts.

Today the Golden Triangle is not much different. One of the countries, Burma, changed its name to Myanmar, but the triangle is still a den of iniquity.

Maybe even a bigger one!

Enter the Kings Romans Casino, a lavish casino resort built in 2007 by the Hong Kong company Kings Romans Group, who promised the Laotian government they would turn the area back into a paradise.

Well, they sure did.

Like any other lush casino resort in Vegas or Macau, hundreds of heavy gamblers can be seen wagering thousands on each hand of baccarat. World class restaurants, facilities and swimming pools drool over the complex. All the luxuries that can be bestowed on man.

But let's not forget the women. They are one of the luxuries bestowed on the men there. World class and very expensive prostitutes from all the nearby Asian countries are readily available to the highest bidders.

So are the drugs. Not just heroin, but cocaine, hashish, methamphetamines--you name it, Kings Romans´s got it for sale.

So the new glitzy Golden Triangle of the twenty-first century has picked up just where the old one left off. You can read lots more about this place here.

Sunday, February 04, 2018

Million-Dollar Casino Marker/Credit Scam Eerily Similar to the Same Scam I called the Greatest Casino Scam Ever on my Best Scam of the Month Page

Bogus Casino Credit App
I sure hope they didn't get the idea from me! My Best Scam of the Month page is meant to both educate and entertain, not to give people crazy and illegal ideas that can put them in prison and ruin their lives.

A 54-year-old woman named Vivian Wang just pleaded guilty to a million-dollar national casino marker/credit scam by using stolen identities to obtain casino credit for which she and her already-convicted partner in crime, 49-year-old Frank Luo, bilked casinos countrywide for more than a million bucks.

They used a plan which I described in the writing of the infamous Roselli Brothers Casino-Credit Scam that was pulled off by a trio of New Jersey brothers in the late 1990s. The Rosellis were a bit more successful, though--about 37 times more successful. Their take was in the neighborhood of $37 million.

And they never got caught.

And their giant scam was hushed-up by Las Vegas and Atlantic City casinos looking to avoid the bad publicity.

The first step in this Wang/Luo version was the same as the Rosellis'. They stole identities of people to open up bank accounts and set up credit lines with the casinos. However, they differed a bit. Whereas the Rosellis resorted to the pilfering of credit histories belonging to established well-to-do people, Wang and Luo used those of migrant workers.

Then they went and established small credit lines under various names and corresponding bank accounts, then showed the casinos false action on the tables via offset-betting procedures at craps and baccarat, in which their losses on one side of the table were recovered by cohorts on the other side betting against them.

The next step was to get their credit lines raised, which they did by paying off all their markers in timely fashion. This process was repeated many times, each time getting an increase in their credit lines, until they finally "busted-out" the casinos when their credit lines reached a high-enough limit.

Like the Rosellis, Wang and Luo used several "employees" posing as the bogus high rollers.

I do not know how they were finally busted after the six years (2008 to 2014) they scammed the casinos.

Lou pleaded guilty last year and received 3 years in prison. Wang, on the other hand, is facing 20 years and a half-million-dollar fine.

To read about the Roselli giant casino credit scam go to my Casino Scam of the Month Page here and scroll down to Credit/Identity Scam.

My take: First of all, Wang and Luo had to have worked very hard to turn histories of migrant workers who surely had no credit ratings into very creditworthy people--at least as far as the casinos were concerned. This fact brings to light the lack of casino thoroughness in deciding who they issue credit to. Perhaps they just look at credit-scam losses as just another cost of doing business, the same way giant retailers expense shoplifting losses.

Tuesday, January 30, 2018

Casino-Cheating Scams keep Piling up in Macau

Lots of Cheating in Macau
The biggest one lately of course was the employee theft of $6 million from the Wynn Macau. The dealer who stole the chips from the VIP room inside the casino has admitted his crime but has not told authorities where the thieved chips are.

But this scam is not the only major one in Macau lately.

In an unnamed Macau casino a husband-and-wife cheat-team beat a baccarat game for $50,000. She was the dealer and he was the fake high roller. The scam was simple enough: She just gave him more money in chips each time he exchanged cash for chips. She also overpaid his winning bets. Their scam started at the end of last December and was busted last week after a month. It is not clear how many times the pair worked the baccarat table.

There have also been reports of collusion overpaying scams at roulette. Here the dealers stick big denomination chips into roulette stacks they push across the layout to their cohorts who have placed winning bets. $1,000 chips hidden at the bottom of a roulette stack of $5 chips seem to go unnoticed in certain casinos in Macau.

Add to this all the "dead chip" scams and hustles in the VIP room and Macau can certainly be called the Wild Wild East of casino cheating.

My take: Much like the casinos in Singapore, the dealer-insider cheating-scams are quite banal but surprisingly suck out a lot of money before the casinos catch on to them.

Sunday, January 28, 2018

New Baccarat Cheating Scam--This Time in Scotland

This shithole coughed up 300K???
It wasn't a baccarat edge-sorting scam, nor was it a baccarat false-shuffle scam. What is was is a bit unclear but the latest baccarat scam at Genting's Glasgow casino revolves around the transparent shoe used in the dealing of the game.

Apparently a team of casino cheats from Manchester, England visited the casino several times over a four-month period and were somehow able to tamper with the baccarat card shoe by distracting the dealer. I don't know what the tampering actually consisted of and I can't venture a guess beyond that it involved some form of marking the backs of the cards.

It would make more sense to me that a dealer or dealers were involved in this baccarat scam but there is no mention of that. What was mentioned is that the baccarat cheat scam netted 200,000 pounds and the manager of the casino was sacked.

Looking at the photo of this place, it's hard to believe that 200,000 quid came out of it!

Friday, January 26, 2018

Question about the $6 Million Chip heist at the Wynn Macau

Lots of Chips to Cash Out!
You've all heard by now that an ex-dealer at the Wynn Macau who says he's been a heavy gambler since puberty is responsible for the disappearance of more than $6 million of the casinos chips. But in spite of his confession, he supposedly is refusing to tell authorities where the stolen chips are or if some of them may have already been cashed out.

To me, that's the confusing issue: cashed out.

Like in most Vegas casinos, chips obtained at the Wynn Macau can only be cashed out at the Wynn  Macau. It is not like the old days in Vegas where you could cash out one casino's chips inside another casino, which was a great help for casino-cheat team looking to get rid of "hot" chips just used in a cheat move. Unless there was a city-wide casino-cage alert for one particular casino's chips, cheats and hustlers generally had no problem cashing out one casino's chips at another casino's cage.

But the free-cash-out privilege has long disappeared in Vegas and, as far as I know, never had validity in  Macau.

So, that brings me to the question. I have read accounts that the dealer and his cohorts, if there are any, may have "fenced" the $6 million lot of chips to an underground Macau banking system controlled by the Chinese Mafia, known as the Triad, but for just a piece on the Hong Kong dollar. I have also read that the only way to get rid of the chips and then turn them into cash is to cash them out at the Wynn Macau in small amounts so as not to pick up heat.

Which begs to ask: Did the dealer steal $6 million in chips of small denominations? If he did so he would have needed quite the large wheelbarrow to wheel them out of the casino. But if he stole the $6 million in high denomination chips, such as $500 and above, then I would think the casino can simply remove all their high denomination chips from circulation and replace them with another set. Doing so would make it impossible to cash out the stolen high-denomination chips and render them essentially worthless.

Unless of course the dealer removed the chips from the VIP room where there seems to be an inventory and accounting system much unlike that of the central casino cages. I have heard that the chips trafficked inside Macau VIP rooms are not easily tracked.

All major casinos across the world have sets of back-up chips that can be put into circulation at any time. So I am wondering which denomination chips make up the missing Wynn Macau six-million.

If anyone out there can enlighten me, please do and I will pass along the information.